In his later political writings, Derrida focused much on the ethical and political question of alterity and is well known for his political interventions on behalf of the sans-papiers in France. These interventions were guided in particular by an ethics of hospitality which he developed through a progressive reading of Kant with Levinas. In an interview in Le Monde, Derrida tantalisingly suggests that hospitality is ultimately 'an art and a poetics, yet a whole politics depends on it and a whole ethics is determined through it' (Derrida 1997a [Our Translation]).
Derrida therefore does not criticize Kant for limiting universal hospitality. On the contrary, he sees nothing fortuitous in "the one who destroys at its source the very possibility of what he posits and determines in this way" (ibid, 71) . For Kant the guest is always a foreigner and sets up his relationship to him as a matter of law. Derrida concurs and draws from this the limit of hospitality that must operate everywhere, that is to say, the necessity of a border that operates as a line behind which to negotiate with the other (in State terms this border acts as the natural control point of the flow of immigration) (Derrida 1999, 90) . At the same time, Derrida reinterprets the Kantian necessity for conditional hospitality within a framework that does not simply posit legal rights of visitation but that constitutes the political tension and the (in)justice of the decision between conditional and unconditional hospitality. This is why Derrida avers that deconstruction is hospitality: 'Hospitality is the deconstruction of the at-home; deconstruction is hospitality to the other, to the other than oneself, the other that its "other," to an other that is beyond any "its other" ' (Derrida 2002, 364) . Instead of the nihilistic, apolitical and irresponsible practice with which it is sometimes charged, deconstruction is the affirmation of life, a responsible reflection and welcoming of the other that amounts to nothing less than an originary ethics.
The clear parallel is with Derrida's other famous pair of binary imperatives: law and justice. In his seminal essay 'The Force of Law: The Mystical Foundations of Authority', Derrida states unequivocally, 'deconstruction is justice ' (ibid, 243) . He distinguishes the exercise of justice as 'law, legitimacy or legality, a stabilizable, statutory and calculable apparatus, a system of regulated and coded prescriptions' from justice as 'infinite, incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to symmetry, heterogeneous and heterotropic' The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com (ibid, 250) , that is, justice as the 'experience of the impossible ' (ibid, 244) . Law is to justice as conditional hospitality is to pure hospitality. If pure justice and pure hospitality are experiences of the impossible, then it is precisely this impossibility that leaves open the call to justice and the need for hospitality. Crucially and at the same time, the impossibility of a fully just law and the impossibility of ever achieving pure hospitality means there will always be the unavoidable injustice of inhospitality that is the structural violence of the encounter with the other.
It is not, however, simply the case that that we are left abandoned to the injustice of inhospitality, with no further recourse than to play out our responsibility to the other through a response to the call of pure hospitality. Since hospitality is in fact always a failure of hospitality--a hostile violence in the substitution between host and guest--there is also always at play a scene of forgiveness. Not only must the host forgive the guest his encroachment in order for there to be a welcoming, the host must beg forgiveness of the guest for his failure and for his violence in never being welcoming enough. To welcome the other is never to be ready for the other and to always be surprised by the other since the other is by definition unforeseeable, unknown, and strange. 'I am always, if I can say so, always and structurally, lacking, at fault, and therefore condemned to be forgiven, or rather to have to ask for forgiveness for my lack of preparation, for an irreducible and constitutive unpreparedness ' (ibid, 381 ). Yet forgiveness, like decision, operates on a plane of mad hyperbole. For there to be true forgiveness, there must be the impossible forgiving of the unforgivable, just like for there to be responsible decision, there must be the experience of the undecidable. Moreover, one can never offer forgiveness, for this presumes the 'haughty' power to pardon that reintroduces a sovereign act of violence (ibid, 389). Instead one must beg forgiveness in cognizance of what Heidegger termed the 'debt' or 'guilt' (schuldig) that corresponds to the originary lack in being (Dasein) insofar as it never possesses itself in virtue of its 'thrownness' (ibid, 383). Conversely, the one who forgives must do the impossible--he or she must forgive the unforgivable fact of one's existence with others. This is an aporetic act that must both be expressed yet also remain silent. It must be expressed The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com because forgiveness means nothing unless it is known and it must remain silent because any expression of it risks driving it back into the economy of a gift that is offered in expectation of a grateful return (ibid, 399). Ultimately, hospitality and the forgiveness of Therefore, a brief digression into Levinas' philosophy will allow us to understand better how and why hospitality is described as 'ethical', and why sensitivity to the ethics/politics distinction is important. His philosophy was born out of a critique of Martin Heidegger, whose well known revolutionary intellectual manoeuvre was to reduce the question of metaphysics to a question of Being. Such an inquiry, known as 'ontology', identifies the human subject to be always-already thrown into a situation of the world's Being. Authentic subjectivity (Dasein) is that which questions its own Being in world. As thrown into its worldly situation, the subject already has a 'pre-ontological' interpretation, unconditional hospitality may therefore be understood as an irrecusable originary ethics (as the originary ethics), opposed to the conditional hospitality of politics where the dilemmas of choice, limits and finitude arise. Put otherwise, unconditional hospitality refers to a structuring debt to the other at the foundation of human subjectivity; conditional hospitality refers to political hospitality in a visible, empirical sense, at the level of rights, borders, citizenship, and so on. The time comes when one has to choose: when one is faced with more than one ethical demand. This situation is 'the limit of responsibility and the birth of the question: What do I have to do with justice?' (Levinas 1998, 157) . This is, in other words, the birth of politics, where unconditional ethical hospitality meets its frontier, and decisions and principles are required within the multiplicity. Therefore, whilst separated and irreducible to each other, ethics and politics may inform one another. As Simon Critchley puts it, '[i]f ethics without politics is empty, then politics without ethics is blind' (Critchley 1999, 283) .
Although ethically it is unconditional, one cannot say that at the political level hospitality is always the right choice, because one cannot be hospitable to all. Indeed, Levinas was acutely aware of the harsh reality of politics. In a notorious radio interview, when asked whether the Palestinian is, for the Israeli, the deserving other par excellence, he said the following:
[I]f your neighbour attacks another neighbour or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity we can find an enemy, or at least then we are faced with the problem of knowing who is right and who is wrong, who is just and who is unjust. There are people who are wrong. (Levinas 1989, 294) .
Whilst at the heart of humanity is an originary ethics, a subjective welcoming of the other person, this does not negate the necessity of politics in all its coldness and brutality. The issue, then, at the core of this critique, is Derrida's pursuance of hospitality at this political level. Does this not over-simplify the political problematic, revealing a questionable assumption that all people desire (political) hospitality, and that the latter is favoured notions, it is structured by aporia. The most immediately striking of these aporias is its dichotomy of conditional and unconditional hospitality, whereby conditional laws are necessary to give effect to unconditional hospitality whilst simultaneously betraying the latter by their limits (Derrida 2000, 77) . Both conditional and unconditional hospitality need each other, and are denied by each other. But as well as this, we argue that there is a further aporia, which arises (or perhaps is merely rendered more visible) when hospitality can only be pursued by renouncing itself. There are, we argue, certain situations where the demand placed by the other is, inescapably, for one to desist from hospitality, and as such the unconditional hospitable answer must undo itself. These situations are exemplified by the possibility of the other that does not want inclusion. In this scene, hospitality must directly face its own violence. The first aporia tells us that hospitality is never enough: one can always be more hospitable, and one never truly meets the demand of the other. This self-contradiction and this impossibility reaches its zenith in the second aporia, which manifests when hospitality must deny itself. This is the absolute limit point of hospitality's self-contradiction, where it must not only recognise the residue of violence that is necessitated by its structural impossibility, but furthermore, it is revealed to be violence itself. This would be to conceive of the political situation where hospitality and violence become indistinguishable.
Derrida takes a position that is in one sense the inverse of Kant's. Whereas Kant held that the natural situation is one of war, and that law is required to institute peace, Derrida holds that peace, as the pacifistic welcoming of the other, is the originary relation.
However, even war and violence must still presuppose and bear the trace of hospitality (Derrida 1999, 90) ; and politics, even when unavoidably brutal, is still guided by ethics.
Similarly, in Politics of Friendship, Derrida counsels the reader that in the field of the political, 'the enemy can hate or wage war on me in the name of friendship, for Friendship's sake, out of friendship for friendship ' (Derrida 1997b, 72) . In other words, against the tradition of political theory exemplified by Carl Schmitt, enmity is not the irreducible determinant of the political. Rather, it is one particular strategy or effect, built upon the true foundation: the possibility of friendship. In a similar vein, we suggest that in the name of hospitality, obligated by the unconditional demand to respond and to be responsible, one must, if the situation demands, refuse hospitality. This renunciation is, predictably by now, impossible. The effect is that hospitality becomes its own torsion, turning itself inside out, attempting to disavow itself for the sake of itself. One is here reminded of Levinas' account of ethical subjectivity, toward which Derrida paid no small amount of admiration in the development of his notion of hospitality. Levinas tells us that the subject is both constituted and undone in the relation with the other because, paradoxically, only a separated being can exist for the other. In this contradictory constitution of the subject, as the 'anguish of contraction and breakup ' (Levinas 1998, 108) , the 'contraction' signifies a 'recurrence to oneself out of an irrecusable exigency of the other' (ibid, 109). Does this not indicate that ethics or hospitality cannot be pure devotion or welcoming, and that they require, or require the recognition of, separation? Just as the autonomous egotic self must undo itself in identification of its debt to the other, so too the absolutely selfless gesture of heteronomous hospitality must undo it-'self', signalling the return to the self.
Conveniently, the production of this article serves as something of a performative metaphor of the argument with which we conclude. This piece was (thankfully) not born out of consensus, but a productive debate that, we hope, has continued without being reconciled in its committal from words to paper. This process of writing has, we realise, raised many of the dilemmas of borders and hospitality that we have discussed substantively. How, for example, do two authors say some-thing without assimilation, and so without becoming one singular author? In other words, how do we articulate a point or an argument whilst still retaining our independent authorship? Co-authorship occurs at the threshold between, on the one hand, absolute separation, and on the other hand, absolute consensus or assimilation. In the same way that Kant conceived the world as a finite globe that we must share as members of a grand cosmopolitical constellation, this essay represents a more modest finite space, a microcosm that two authors inhabit. In openly confronting each other within a single work, a dissensus has been exposed that may not have been so palpable if there had been a statement of positions in two independent contributions. Here we hope we have demonstrated the necessity to address
